Government Intervention in Labor Markets: A Property Rights Perspective by Mitchell, Daniel J.
Volume 33 Issue 6 Article 4 
1988 
Government Intervention in Labor Markets: A Property Rights 
Perspective 
Daniel J. Mitchell 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Daniel J. Mitchell, Government Intervention in Labor Markets: A Property Rights Perspective, 33 Vill. L. 
Rev. 1043 (1988). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol33/iss6/4 
This Symposia is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
1988]
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN LABOR MARKETS:
A PROPERTY RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE
DANIEL J. MITCHELLt
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE question of whether labor laws should be applied to small
business fundamentally assumes that present laws are accept-
able. A large body of economic and philosophical research would
disagree with this assumption, however, and instead suggest that
the relevant inquiry is whether it is appropriate for the govern-
ment to intervene in any labor markets.' Current labor laws re-
strict individual freedom. It is my contention that government
should not interfere with certain personal decisions, including the
freedom of employers and employees to contract freely, unfet-
tered by labor regulations.
This article begins with a brief philosophical overview of the
fundamental notion of freedom. Next, it explores the freedom to
contract which has not traditionally been afforded the same pro-
tection as other fundamental rights and with which both unions
and government interfere. This article then applies various eco-
nomic and legal principles to some small business issues and con-
cludes that government intervention is an improper solution.
The best means of achieving economic prosperity is complete de-
regulation of all labor markets both large and small.
t Director of Tax and Budget Policy, Citizens for a Sound Economy, Wash-
ington, D.C.; B.A. 1981, M.A. 1985, University of Georgia; doctoral candidate,
George Mason University.
1. See, e.g., C. HOOVER, THE ECONOMY, LIBERTY AND THE STATE 325-94
(1959) (less state interference in economy allows maximization of personal lib-
erty); J.S. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 944-47 (J. Robson ed. 1965)
[hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY] (government should not inter-
fere with labor market because consumers and workers have immediate interests
in its efficient function and can best react to market signals unhindered by gov-
ernmental meddling); C. NISHIYAMA & K. LEUBE, THE ESSENCE OF HAYEK 53-100
(1984) (social justice and liberty are maximized by decentralized market al-
lowing its participants freedom of decisionmaking rather than restraining market
through cumbersome, inefficient governmental intrusion); A. SMITH, THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 3-86 (1776) (labor markets which are determined by supply
and demand can best fill needed occupations and skills by offering relatively
higher wages).
(1043)
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II. FREEDOM AND THE FREE MARKET SYSTEM
Before specifically addressing labor law, a brief discussion of
the philosophical approach underlying this article is necessary
and, hopefully, will be fruitful. Simply stated, those who wish to
use the power of government to infringe upon the rights of life,
liberty and property2 should bear the burden of demonstrating
the need for government involvement.3 To the maximum extent
possible, we should follow the classical liberal prescription of very
limited government where people are free "to truck, barter and
exchange." 4 An individual should be free to do what he wishes
with his life, liberty and property so long as he does not adversely
interfere with other individuals' similar rights. 5
Most advocates of this approach place a very high value on
freedom, 6 and view any proposals that would require the freedom
2. The fifth and fourteenth amendments restrict the power of federal and
state governments providing that, "No person shall be ... deprived of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV § 1.
For a thorough analysis of judicial interpretations of protected rights and due
process under the fifth and fourteenth amendments, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 560-86, 1302-1421 (2d ed. 1988) and the cases cited
therein.
3. See PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 1, at 937 (authoritative
form of government action has limited sphere of legitimate use and requires
strong necessity to justify in every instance). But see United States v. Carolene
Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (regulatory legislation affecting ordinary
commercial transactions is constitutional unless facts are proven which preclude
assumption that legislation rests upon rational basis within knowledge and expe-
rience of legislators).
4. A. SMITH, supra note 1, at 13. Smith contends that the exercise of this
freedom, motivated primarily by the self-interests of individuals with different
talents, advances society. Id. at 13-16.
5. See J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 10-11 (Norton ed. 1975) [hereinafter ON LIB-
ERTY] ("[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant."); see also
Comment, Limiting the State's Police Power: Judicial Reaction to John Stuart Mill, 37 U.
CHI. L. REV. 605 (1970) (discussing attitude of American courts toward use of
Mill's criterion as basis for proscribing state regulation of individual conduct).
For a discussion of Mill's theory as it relates to the fundamental right of privacy,
see L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1303.
6. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 1, at 3 (freedom
and maximization of wealth are connected; Mill commenting: "A people has
sometimes become free, because it had first grown wealthy; or wealthy, because
it had first become free."). But see C. HOOVER, supra note 1. Hoover admits that
it has generally been assumed by laissez-faire proponents that any intrusion by
the state would serve to limit personal freedom. Id. at 325. In fact, after an
examination of such traditional socialist economies as that of the Soviet Union,
Nazi Germany and some Fascist systems, Hoover notes that this correlation ex-
isted primarily because these economic systems had been established by small
tyrannical governments. Id. at 334. Hoover acknowledges, however, that these
experiences do not conclusively prove that a collectivist system which com-
1044
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of individuals to be restricted with great suspicion. Note, how-
ever, that tolerance of others' freedom is not the same as ap-
proval of others' action. A free society might not impose
penalties upon those who abuse drugs, but that is not to say that
individuals in society do not have the freedom to exercise moral
suasion, ostracism and other forms of voluntary control on those
who violate social norms. 7 The same principle would operate to
inhibit those who would abuse the right to free speech or other
rights. Indeed, advocates of a free society would argue that such
societal controls are more effective than governmental coercion
in regulating social behavior.8
Similarly, such uncontrolled freedom in an economic setting
could also result in behavior few would condone. For instance, a
free society would permit the owner of a business to discriminate
in hiring, firing, compensating and promoting employees. As
morally repugnant as such practices are, others should not be
able to invoke some "societal" right to justify imposing their
moral values on an individual simply because they disagree with
how an individual disposes of his property. 9 This reflects the
mences through peaceful, democratic means would necessarily lead to a reduc-
tion of personal liberty. Id. Furthermore, Hoover advances three reasons why
the expansion of the state's role in Western countries in recent times has not
resulted in a net diminution in personal liberty. First, most state action repre-
sents limitations on "business" rather than on "personal liberties." Second,
state economic intervention has usually followed a prior increase in power by
other economic organizations, namely corporations, over individuals. Third,
state encroachment has been gradual and has not resulted in any economic cri-
sis. Id. at 346-51.
7. PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 1, at 941-43. Mill notes
that collectivist action by people in certain areas promotes dynamism and
reduces government dependence because people understand their own busi-
nesses and interests better than government could ever be expected to do. Id.
8. Id. at 944. Mill suggests that persons immediately interested in regulat-
ing their own behavior are better able to repel tyranny because those in govern-
ment tend to divert their energies toward political ambitions and the petty
vanities of office. Id.
9. But see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982). Federal law prohibits discriminatory
practices. Specifically, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin.
Id. See, e.g., Baggett v. Program Resources, Inc., 806 F.2d 178 (8th Cir. 1986)
(employer failed to demonstrate that failure to hire former female employee was
1045
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same principles as Voltaire's famous statement, "I may disap-
prove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to
say it."1°
However, a market system will punish those who discrimi-
nate. In the market, individuals and businesses bear the costs of
their actions. Therefore, any individual who discriminates in
favor of a less qualified person simply because he does not like
the skin color of another who is more highly qualified will bear
the costs in terms of lower profits. It may sound unsophisticated
to people who feel superior to those engaged in commerce and
trade, but most people do not care what color a person's skin is so
long as his money is green. Can the market eliminate such dis-
crimination? It would be preposterous to make such a claim, but
it is very likely that a market system is the best way to minimize
discrimination and other morally reprehensible behavior."
III. THE THREAT TO THE FREEDOM OF CONTRACT FROM
GOVERNMENT ACTION AND MAJORITY RULE
There are some who would argue that certain rights are not
as important as others.' 2 The right to free speech,13 on one hand,
nondiscriminatory); Drazewski v. Waukegan Dev. Center, 651 F. Supp. 754
(N.D. Il. 1986) (where employer knew of employee's inability to work Saturdays,
discharge for her refusal to work on Sabbath established prima facie case of reli-
gious discrimination); Thurber v. Jack Reilly's, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 238 (D. Mass.
1981) (by failing to promote employee because of her sex, despite her qualifica-
tions, employer intentionally discriminated against her on basis of gender), aff'd,
717 F.2d 633 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 904 (1984). For an analysis of
the law of employment discrimination, see B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (1983). For a discussion of federal law requiring
payment of a minimum wage, see infra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
10. J. BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 418 (14th ed. 1968).
11. See PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 1, at 394-96 (compet-
itive industries such as textile manufacturers hire women to avoid paying non-
competitive higher wage for men). But see H. JOHNSON, ON ECONOMICS AND
SOCIETY 30 (1975) (premium jobs in labor market require high level of educa-
tion which system of discrimination prevents those discriminated against from
obtaining).
12. The United States Supreme Court has concluded that some rights are
fundamental and thus deserve greater protection from governmental infringe-
ment than do others. Compare, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 164 (1973)
(statute prohibiting abortions in all cases other than to save mother's life vio-
lated women's fundamental right of privacy under fourteenth amendment due
process clause) and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (stat-
ute prohibiting use of contraceptives found over-inclusive and violative of four-
teenth amendment due process right to privacy within marital relationship) with
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (freedom of contract
is not fundamental right protected under United States Constitution).
However, all rights are property rights. The right to privacy, for example, is
a form of property right which stems from ownership of oneself. Thus, from a
1046
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should be defended, but freedom of contract,' 4 on the other
hand, is not equally important. This dichotomy of rights is in-
defensible. All rights are property rights. The principle of self-
ownership makes what are commonly referred to as individual
rights simply specific forms of property rights. It is a person's
ownership of himself which gives him the right to speak as he
wishes, to choose the religion he wishes and to behave the way he
wishes.' 5 The courts and legal profession deserve much credit
for maintaining and protecting those rights against government,
but they should be equally criticized for neglecting other rights.
To many observers it is a fortunate coincidence that a system
based upon complete respect for all rights is also one which maxi-
mizes prosperity, production and opportunity. 16 The history of
the world offers substantive evidence, however, that freedom and
prosperity do tend to jointly exist and that the less government
that is involved, the more prosperity there will be. 17 Further-
more, while systems based upon freedom do not guarantee equal-
ity of results, the less fortunate in freer societies are usually better
off than the well-to-do in more collectivist societies. In societies
with greater degrees of government control, it is possible to use
the power of the state to enrich an individual at the expense of
another. However, in a free market economy, a person can only
enrich himself by simultaneously making someone else better
off.' 8
property rights perspective, it is logically inconsistent to provide greater protec-
tion to one subset of property rights than to another. For a discussion of the
property rights perspective, see infra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
13. The first amendment establishes the fundamental right of free speech.
See U.S. CONST. amend I. The first amendment provides in pertinent part:
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." Id.
14. See West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 391. In West Coast Hotel, the Supreme
Court noted that the Constitution does not mention freedom of contract, but
rather "speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due
process of law." Id. Moreover, the Court added that "freedom of contract is a
qualified and not an absolute right. There is no absolute freedom to do as one
wills or to contract as one chooses." Id. at 392 (citation omitted).
15. For an exposition of first amendment protections guaranteeing free-
dom of speech, religion and association, see G. GUNTHER, CONSTITuTIONAL LAW
972-1531 (llth ed. 1985).
16. For a discussion of potentially conflicting views on the connection be-
tween government intervention in the economy and prosperity, see supra note 6.
17. See C. HOOVER, supra note 1, at 325-56 (noting that personal liberty was
significantly curtailed in traditional socialist countries whereas there was no sig-
nificant curtailment in more prosperous Western countries).
18. See PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 1, at 6. Mill contends
that if an individual desires something he does not possess, he must first find
another who has what he wants and is willing to barter for it. Id. But see A.
1047
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Notwithstanding the evidence linking less government with
prosperity, many classical liberals believe freedom, not prosper-
ity, is the most important characteristic of a society. For instance,
imagine a scenario where executing every left-handed person
would result in a twenty-five percent increase in Gross National
Product. A utilitarian system based strictly upon results might de-
cide executions were a good idea. 19 A society which has freedom
as its highest priority would unilaterally reject such a proposal.
Fortunately, the areas where freedom and prosperity are in con-
flict are exceedingly few, 20 while freedom and government are al-
most always in conflict.21
The classical liberal society is also opposed to the "tyranny of
the majority."'2 2 Rights, including property rights, should not be
subject to majority rule. A worker's freedom to enter into a con-
tract should not be overruled by the majority any more than a
BUCHANAN, ETHICS, EFFICIENCY, AND THE MARKET 14-15 (1985) (theoretically,
when exchange in ideal market reaches state of equilibrium, no one could be
better off without someone being made worse off).
19. See R. HARRISON, BENTHAM 168 (1983) (fundamental axiom guiding
state action is: "[I]t is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the
measure of right and wrong") (quotingJ. BENTHAM, FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT
393 (1776)).
20. See M. ROTHBARD, AMERICA'S GREAT DEPRESSION (1975) (Rothbard con-
tends that Great Depression was caused by government intervention in econ-
omy, not by failure of private sector and that only course to assure rapid
recovery in any depression is strict policy of governmental nonintervention); see
also Boettke & Ellig, The Business of Government and Government as a Business, in A
NATION IN DEBT 272-86 (R. Fink ed. 1987) (authors contend that deficit problem
is fundamentally expenditure problem and that privatization of federal govern-
ment services including monetary system would aid in control and reduction of
federal deficit); Hayet, Inflation, Misdirection of Labor, and Unemployment, in A NA-
TION IN DEBT 143-53 (R. Fink ed. 1987) (high and stable level of employment
can only be achieved through reestablishment of properly functioning market
where free play of wages and prices establish corresponding supply and de-
mand). But see M. BLEANEY, THE RISE AND FALL OF KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS 40-80
(1985) (examination of efforts of various traditional free market nations to es-
cape evils of Great Depression indicates that private sector efforts failed; only by
implementing various state public works programs could capitalist economics
stimulate aggregate demand to position of equilibrium).
21. See PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 1, at 936-37 (distin-
guishing between two types of government action in economy: (1) "authorita-
rian" action which infringes upon individual freedom by dictating conduct; and
(2) "informational" action which allows market participants to make more in-
formed decisions by giving advice and promulgating information).
22. See F. BERGER, HAPPINESS, JUSTICE, AND FREEDOM 194-95 (1984).
Although Mill advanced representational government, justice requires that the
minority be given a voice in matters affecting their rights. Id. The fear is that a
representational government which elects only majority representatives effec-
tively precludes minorities from any further influence on government so that
efforts need to be made to ensure that every group of people is represented
proportionately. Id.
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communist's free speech should be subject to the whims of the
majority. Indeed, protection of rights against the tyranny of the
majority is a key feature of a republican form of government. 23
James Madison foresaw the future when he warned: "Democra-
cies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have
ever been found incompatible with personal security, or the rights
of property." 24
A system based upon the principle of majority rule will al-
ways pose a threat to the minority.2 5 Whether it was the voters in
the South getting legislatures to enact Jim Crow laws (usually
over the objections of the private businesses which would lose the
patronage of black customers) or the voters of today seeking leg-
islation to enrich themselves at the expense of their fellow man,
majority rule is not a morally defensible system.
The collectivist mindset recoils at this notion, assuming that
if the system is not majority rule, then it must be minority rule.
The salient point in this argument is that government should
never interfere with certain individual decisions. Whether the
system is majority rule, a republic or a dictatorship, government
has no role interfering with certain inalienable rights.2 6 This phi-
23. See U.S. CONST. amends. I-X (constitutional rights not subject to in-
fringement by Congress); see generally A. MILLER, DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP
111-22 (1981) (predicting end to liberal democracy given increase in power of
executive branch and bureaucracy which undercuts traditional parliamentary
government).
24. SeeJ. LEWIS, LIBERTY RECLAIMED: A NEW LOOK AT AMERICAN POLITICS 7
(1984).
25. Id. Lewis states:
This opposition to Democracy on the part of our Founding Fathers
was not based on a hatred of human liberty or individual rights. On the
contrary it was their love of liberty and individual rights which caused
them to reject Democracy. In a Democracy the majority rules and ma-
jorities are notorious for rejecting and trampling on the rights of mi-
norities. The Founding Fathers, because they believed that all people
have equal rights, did not believe that the size of a mob endowed it with
any power to deny rights to the minority.
Id. at 7-8.
26. PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 1, at 938. Mill states:
[T]here is a circle around every individual human being, which no gov-
ernment, be it that of one, of a few, or of the many, ought to be permit-
ted to overstep: there is a part of the life of every person who has come
to years of discretion, within which the individuality of that person
ought to reign uncontrolled either by any other individual or by the
public collectively. That there is, or ought to be, some space in human
existence thus entrenched around, and sacred from authoritative intru-
sion, no one who professes the smallest regard to human freedom or
dignity will call in question: the point to be determined is, where the
limit should be placed; how large a province of human life this reserved
territory should include. I apprehend that it ought to include all that
7
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losophy contributed heavily to America's early government and
was appreciated by many of the Founding Fathers. 27
IV. GOVERNMENTAL INTERFERENCE WITH THE
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
I classify my approach to labor law as the moderate approach.
To the right of this approach are situated those who might like to
outlaw unions,28 pass laws to limit unions2 9 or otherwise use the
power of the state to bias the system in favor of employers.30 To
the left are situated those who want to do just the opposite. Their
agenda is to use the power of the state to bias the system in favor
of unions by passing laws which interfere with free choice.3' My
position is one of strict neutrality. The government should not
take sides in employer-employee issues. As moderate as my posi-
tion is, most people today feel that it is the business of govern-
ment to actively intervene on behalf of labor. Thus, my position
is likely to be seen as conservative.
Succinctly stated, I believe that government should not limit
the freedom of employers and employees to enter into whatever
part which concerns only the life, whether inward or outward, of the
individual, and does not affect the interests of others, or affects them
only through the moral influence of example.
Id.
27. See D. HUTCHINSON, THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION 286-321
(1975) (colonial experience together with view of Framers resulted in express
protections of individual rights from governmental interference in Bill of
Rights).
28. See R. FREEMAN &J. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 40 (1984) (in polit-
ical sphere, there are numerous employer associations which often oppose goals
of AFL-CIO and labor movement in general).
29. See M. REYNOLDS, POWER AND PRIVILEGE 264-66 (1984) (rather than out-
law or repress unions, solution is to deregulate them to point where workers and
worker organizations are treated in manner consistent with way in which every-
one else is treated under contract and tort law); see also Mikva, The Changing Role
of the Wagner Act in the American Labor Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1123, 1127
(1986) (Congress passed Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 to counteract what many saw
as excessive power of post-Wagner unions).
30. See generally Weiler, Milestone or Tombstone. The Wagner Act at Fifty, 23
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 12 (1986) (President Reagan's appointees to National La-
bor Relations Board have been fairly pro-employer in their sentiments). For a
reference to several economists who take a generally negative view of labor un-
ions, see R. FREEMAN &J. MEDOFF, supra note 28, at 261 n.1.
31. See R. FREEMAN &J. MEDOFF, supra note 28, at 22 (although unions are
politically forceful in certain markets and have been very influential in passage of
general social legislation, they have been largely unable to obtain special interest
legislation favorable to them over opposition of business groups). For a refer-
ence to several economists with a generally positive view of labor unions, see id.
at 261 n.2.
1050 [Vol. 33: p. 1043
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contracts they feel are in their respective interests. The role of
government is to enforce the contracts. This means that an em-
ployer should not be forced to recognize a union if he chooses
not to. s2 Nor should he be prohibited from hiring, firing, pro-
moting or demoting whomever he wants, for whatever reason he
wants.33
Fundamentally, this is a question of property rights. If an-
other person owns a business, I do not have a right to interfere
with his choices as to what he does with his property-so long as
he does not interfere with my rights of life, liberty and property.
Similarly, a property rights perspective also would reject so-
called right-to-work laws3 4 which infringe upon the employers'
freedom of contract to hire only union members3 5 which is some-
thing employers may wish to do since it can lower transaction
costs. The classical liberal position would also permit secondary
boycotts3 6 so long as such activities are the result of uncoerced
32. But see 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982) ("It shall be an unfair labor practice
for an employer.., to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of
his employees .... ").
33. For a discussion of current law prohibiting such discriminatory prac-
tices, see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
34. See 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1982) (federal law expressly allows state to en-
act legislation prohibiting agreements requiring membership in labor organiza-
tion as condition of employment); 51 C.J.S. Labor Relations § 10 (1967 & Supp.
1988) (outlining state legislation and cases interpreting right-to-work laws).
35. Advocates of right-to-work laws argue that an employee's right to be
free from forced membership in a union outweighs an employer's interest in
hiring whomever he chooses. For example, in Finney v. Hawkins the Virginia
court stated:
There was evidence to be found in the acts of many States and of the
Federal Congress to support the view that discrimination against em-
ployees because they did or did not belong to a union was against the
public interest and should not be allowed .... Basically, agreements
involving such discrimination are hostile to our free enterprise system
and to individual liberty of choice and action. Legislation that protects
the citizen in his freedom to disagree and to decline an association
which a majority would thrust upon him on the ground that it knows
what is best for him, does no violence to the spirit of our fundamental
law. The protection of minorities is the boast of our institutions and a
basis of their asserted superiority over totalitarian regimes. The results
have demonstrated the value of the democratic process.
189 Va. 878, 888, 54 S.E.2d 872, 877 (1949).
36. A secondary boycott is a union pressure tactic through which a union
exerts economic pressure upon a second employer with whom it has no dispute
in order to compel this employer to cease doing business with the target em-
ployer with whom the union does have a dispute. Federal law prohibits secon-
dary boycotts. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4), (e) (1982). But see Herman, Erosion of Trade
Union Freedom Under the Law, 44 GUILD PRACTITIONER 60, 62 (1987) (secondary
boycotts neither inherently evil nor unfair, but common-sense responses by or-
ganized labor to come to each other's aid during strikes).
9
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agreement between private institutions. A property rights per-
spective also gives the individual complete discretion to negotiate
with all potential employers making the choice he feels is in his
self interest.
V. APPLICATION OF THE FREE MARKET AND FREEDOM OF
CONTRACT FRAMEWORK TO SMALL BUSINESS
In this section, I will apply this legal and economic frame-
work to small businesses, although it is applicable to larger busi-
nesses as well. The simplest way to do this is to select a few issues
and to examine how those issues actually affect employees and
employers.
One of the most popular government restrictions on labor
markets is the minimum wage. 37 Most people believe that the
government is acting in the interests of the poor when it passes
laws to artificially raise wages.38 The actual results of the mini-
mum wage, however, are vastly different than supporters would
like to believe. One of the major effects of higher minimum
wages is to reduce employment opportunities for the least fortu-
nate in our society.3 9 If an individual is young, poorly educated
and a minority, his services may not be worth $3.35 per hour to
37. See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1982 & Supp. 1985) (federal law requiring all em-
ployers, with certain exceptions, to pay all employees at least designated mini-
mum hourly rate which is currently $3.35 per hour).
38. In fact, a review of the legislative history indicates that Congress's in-
tent in providing minimum wage legislation was to aid the poor. See H.R. REP.
No. 151, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 3201. Specifically, it states:
The passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 was heralded as a
very important step toward protecting working Americans from pov-
erty. By fixing a floor below which wages could not fall, it was expected
that individuals who worked full time, year-round, would be guaranteed
an income on which one could maintain a minimum living standard and
not find it necessary to either rely upon Government assistance, if avail-
able, or go without basic necessities.
Id. at 3214. However, legislative history, which tries to find the public interest
rationale for legislation, is very naive. Testimony of specific interest groups and
impassioned congressional speeches do not necessarily reveal the true purposes
behind the passage of legislation. This is definitely true in the case of the mini-
mum wage. For some introductory comments on why minimum wage increases
are really passed, see W. WILLIAMS, THE STATE AGAINST BLACKS (1982); M.
KIBBE, THE MINIMUM WAGE: WASHINGTON'S PERENNIAL MYTH (May 23, 1988)
(Cato Institute, Policy Analysis No. 106).
39. See M. REYNOLDS, supra note 29, at 143 (recent econometric study claims
that decline in black teenage employment during 1950's and 1960's occurred in
agriculture in South and that federal minimum wage acted as barrier to employ-
ment opportunities outside agriculture) (citing Cogan, The Decline in Black Teen-
age Employment: 1950-1970, 72 AM. EcON. REV. 621-38 (1982)). Cf Hashimoto,
The Minimum Wage Law and Youth Crimes: Time-Series Evidence, 30J.L. & ECON. 443,
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an employer. Therefore, if the government says that he cannot
go to a potential employer and offer his services at $3.00 per
hour, he is out of luck. The lower rungs of the proverbial ladder
of opportunity have been raised out of reach.
This raises a very interesting question: Why do unions, very
few of whose members earn anything near the minimum wage,
expend so many resources lobbying for higher minimum
wages? 40 Some would claim that concern for their fellow workers,
however misguided, drives their efforts. 4 1 Economic analysis
would dispute this, and suggest that the desire to increase the
costs of competing nonunion labor is a stronger motive.42 One of
the permanent challenges facing unions trying to maintain above
average wages for their members is how to prevent employers
from simply hiring less expensive nonunion employees. One way
of accomplishing this is to raise the wages of nonunion employees
to reduce the disparity.43 That, in addition to all of the other
legal impediments erected by current labor law,44 discourages
employers from hiring nonunion labor and gives the union more
461 (1987) (past increases in federal minimum wage appear to have increased
teenage arrests for certain crimes relative to arrests for all age groups).
40. But see C. NOYES, ECONOMIc FREEDOM 205 (1943) (certain segments of
organized labor originally opposed minimum wage laws since they felt minimum
wages would become "practical maximums" and thus, undermine efforts aimed
at recruiting new members).
41. See M. REYNOLDS, supra note 29, at 142-43 (support of minimum wage
legislation by organized labor widely advertised as evidence of unions' concern
for welfare of all workers, but actual effect is to deny inexperienced workers
opportunities which would allow them to increase their skills and productivity).
42. See id. at 142-44. In addition, Reynolds believes that the real anti-com-
petitive effect on the labor market is that the higher minimum wage prevents
new entrants in the labor market from gaining valuable experience and training
through nonunion employment. Id. Thus, by denying new entrants the oppor-
tunity to gain experience, the skilled or semi-skilled labor force can determine
the size of the experienced labor pool. Id.
43. See G. TYLER, A LEGISLATIVE CAMPAIGN FOR A FEDERAL MINIMUM WAGE
1 (1959) (higher minimum wage needed to close wage differential between
union and nonunion jobs so as to curtail unemployment, wage cuts and wage
freezes in unionized industries).
44. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1982). Section 158 provides in pertinent
part as follows:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title [rights to self-organ-
ization, collective bargaining, etc.];
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration
of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization... ;
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leverage. Finally, of course, since wage differentials exist, any
success the unions have in increasing the costs of lower paid labor
will put upward pressure on their wages. 45
Another labor issue which is being hotly debated is mandated
health insurance benefits.46 With all the evidence of how national
health care has failed around the world, proponents have
switched their efforts to legislation which would coerce all em-
ployers into providing health insurance for employees.4 7 Figures
show that about one-seventh of the population, approximately
thirty-seven million people, are not covered by health
insurance.48
There are two major problems with this approach. It as-
sumes that greedy businesses could be providing those benefits
now, but because we lack the progressive legislation forcing them
to do so, they do not. This is highly unlikely. Many businesses,
particularly small businesses, do not generate substantial profits.
It is very likely that they simply cannot afford to pay more, and if
forced, they will have to lay off employees, raise prices (if they
can) or possibly go out of business. One estimate of the expense
of this legislation concludes that public and private sector costs
will increase by thirty to forty billion dollars yearly. 49
Moreover, the issue is not simply one of cost. Mandated
(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee
because he has filed charges or given testimony under this subchapter;
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees ....
Id.
45. See G. TYLER, supra note 43, at 1 (higher minimum wage would preserve
employment in unionized plant and lay groundwork for future increases in
union contract).
46. See S. 1265, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S7055 (1987).
47. See ROBERT R. NATHAN Assoc., INC., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE PRI-
VATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR COSTS OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION CALLING FOR ADDI-
TIONAL BENEFITS FOR EMPLOYEES (January 1988) (prepared for the National
Foundation for the Study of Employment Policy). The mandated health insur-
ance bill applies to all employers other than the federal government. Id. at 1.
The bill requires employers to provide specified health benefits including in-
patient and out-patient health care by physicians and hospitals, diagnostic and
screening tests, as well as prenatal and well-baby care. Id. Full-time employees
(those working at least 17.5 hours per week) are entitled to benefits. Id. Em-
ployers pay at least eighty percent of the insurance premiums. Employees pay
the remainder. Id. at 2.
48. Id. at 5.
49. See id. at 5. The National Foundation for the Study of Employment Pol-
icy has noted that the increase in labor compensation costs resulting from man-
dated benefits and similar legislation would most severely impact small
businesses. NATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR THE STUDY OF ECONOMIC POLICY, THE
NATHAN STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW 2 (1988).
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health benefits also infringe upon the rights of employers and em-
ployees to negotiate between themselves to determine an optimal
wage-and-benefits package. If the government mandates health
benefits, that may simply force cutbacks in wages or other benefits
which employees may value more highly than health insurance.
Not all of these issues can be divided along liberal or con-
servative lines. As I mentioned before, the moderate, neutrality
approach to which I adhere does not believe in right-to-work
laws. Some would argue that nobody should be forced to join a
union as a condition of employment. The relevant issue in this
instance, however, is not whether one can be forced to join a
union, because a person cannot; if he does not like the union, he
can refuse the job. The real issue is whether a business and its
employees should have the freedom to choose to sign contracts
which have union membership as a condition of employment.50
The issues I mention here only touch upon the problems of
unnecessary and counterproductive government regulations.
Small businesses, because of their size, are hurt more than big
businesses, but that is not the important point. The important
point is that small businesses will become even more hampered if
forced to comply with current labor laws.
VI. PROPOSAL: DEREGULATION OF ALL BUSINESS
Undoubtedly, there is something inequitable about small
businesses being exempt from regulations that are applied to
larger businesses. Such an arrangement creates distortions in an
economy by altering relative prices. The answer to this problem,
however, is not to bring small business under this unworkable
regulatory umbrella. Instead, there is a compelling argument that
larger employers should be freed from the controls and regula-
tions under which they currently labor.
What if the only choice were between the current system,
where small businesses benefit from exemptions, and having all
businesses equally regulated and controlled? Given these alter-
natives, I would favor the current framework. Although it may
seem unfair to larger employers, it would merely compound the
problems by subjecting small businesses to the same harsh labor
laws. The relevant analogy is whether I would free half the pris-
oners in the gulag even though that might be unfair to the re-
50. For a discussion of right-to-work laws, see supra notes 34-35 and accom-
panying text.
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maining victims of oppression. Freedom for some is better than
freedom for none.
Proposals for wholesale elimination of current labor laws re-
quire some understanding and explanation of the practices, insti-
tutions and results that such a step would bring to labor markets.
Standard neoclassical economics advocates that flexible labor
markets will enhance economic efficiency. 5' Output should ex-
pand, resources will be better utilized and additional gains to
trading will be realized. 52
Deregulation of labor markets will not mean slave wages and
robber barons. It is common for even educated people to assume
that, without government "protections," businesses would work
together to force wages down to subsistence levels.53 Of all the
economic flaws in such an assumption,5 4 it can be best refuted by
asking why businesses have not already used such tactics to force
all wages down to the minimum wage?
Simply stated, competition forces employers to provide at-
tractive wages to workers. Their labor is an input in the produc-
tion process. Just as capital, entrepreneurship and other inputs
demand a return, labor also demands a return for its input. It is
not a coincidence that workers in countries that believe capitalism
exploits labor are generally worse off than are workers in the sup-
posedly exploitative countries. 55
As a general rule, a free society will promote the evolution of
institutions which promote prosperity and order. The works of
Friedrich Hayek and Oliver Williamson ably explain how the
spontaneous order of a market system will result in the evolution
of institutions which facilitate wealth creation and production. 56
51. See A. BUCHANAN, supra note 18, at 14-18 (some aspects of efficient mar-
kets are that competition among producers reduces costs of production, compe-
tition among entrepreneurs reduces transaction costs and need for information
by all market participants creates market for information which enables individu-
als and groups to economize; free market enables economy to maximize overall
outputs relative to initial overall inputs).
52. Id.
53. See PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 1, at 340-43 (examin-
ing Ricardo's assumption that wages in free market economy are tied to price of
food to maintain population).
54. See id. Mill discounted the assertion that wages in a free market econ-
omy will be driven down eventually to a subsistence level. Id. Rather, he be-
lieved that wages are primarily determined by the supply and demand for labor.
Id. at 337.
55. For a comparison of capitalist, free-market economies and state-run
communist economies, see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
56. See generally 3 F. HAYEK, LAw, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 74-75 (1979)
(competition, if not prevented by deliberate government policies, tends to pro-
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Therefore, while we can only make general predictions about how
new developments will affect labor markets, we can be confident
that the spontaneous order of the market will generate results
which will benefit society.
Empirical evidence and economic theory suggest that gov-
ernment intervention has worked against the interest of the over-
all populace. The insights explained by public choice theory
illustrate how the power of government is much more likely to be
used for the benefit of special interest groups rather than for the
needs of the general population. 57
Policymakers face a choice between three systems. The first,
complete government control, has been deservedly discounted by
the sheer weight of the evidence. The second, government inter-
vention, is an ad hoc approach which has traditionally been op-
posed on a case-by-case basis. There is sufficient theory and
evidence to reject this approach in favor of the third and prefera-
ble approach-nonintervention based upon respect for property
rights.
duce state of affairs where everything will be produced that someone knows how
to produce and which can be sold profitably, everything produced is by persons
who can do so as cheaply as possible and everything will be sold at lowest possi-
ble prices); 0. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 1-42
(1985) (analyzing capitalistic institutions in terms of transaction-costs economics
theory which advocates that economizing is central to success of economic
organizations).
57. For an introduction to public choice theory, see Gwartney & Wagner,
The Public Choice Revolution, THE INTERCOLLEGIATE REV. 17-26 (Spring 1988).
"Special interest issues ... provide substantial personal gain to a concentrated
group of beneficiaries at a cost which is spread widely among voters .... Id at
20. "The special interest effect helps to explain the presence of tariffs and quo-
tas on steel, automobiles, textiles, and several other products." Id. at 21.
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